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THE PROFESSIONS AND COMPETITION POLICY 
H. w. Arthurs 
Osgoode Hall Law School, York University 
Let me begin by broadly identifying my own position. 
First, I am broadly in favour of the proposed Competition 
Act, the philosophy it expounds, and the mechanisms it 
advances to implement that philosophy. Second, I am 
concerned - as are most professionals - to assure that 
professional services of a high calibre are delivered to 
the public at a price everyone can ·afford and through 
procedures which make them fully and easily accessible . 
Third, I am basically skeptical that the Bill does very 
much to secure the public interest in relation to profession-
al service s. ·'' 
What are the present impediments to the just and 
equitable supply of professional services - and what does 
the Bill do to protect the public interest? 
First, let me turn to the issue of price fixing. 
Through the medium of professional associations, tariffs 
of fees - minimum (and occasionally maximum} fees - are 
established which either guide or compel the practitioner 
in calculating the charges for his services. It is fair 
to say that these tariffs are seldom based on "objective" 
or "scientific" criteri a. Usually they are designed to 
protect or enhance the income level of practitioners . 
They are seldom subject to external scrutiny either in the 
initial setting of the tariff, or in its application in 
any given situation. Of course, there are exceptions, as 
for example in the legal profession, where certain tariffs 
are established by legislation or by order of the court, 
and where some form of independent third party adjudication 
is available to review the appropriateness of the fee in 
any given case. However, even in these rather exceptional 
circumstances, the problem often is that the client does 
not know of his right to seek adjudication. 
Compliance with the tariff is sometimes secured by 
punitive measures. More often, it depends upon voluntary 
adherence secured through publicity. Moreover, fee cutting 
in violation of tariff is sometimes tolerated provided that 
it is not flagrantly used as a method of attracting a 
clientele . 
Given the fact that some form of price fixing is 
reasonably common in the market for professional ·services, 
it is important next to canvass the justifications advanced 
for this practice . .. 
First of all, it is urged, the existence of a tariff 
protects the client from over-charging by giving him a 
guide with which he can predict the likely cost of the 
service he seeks , and against which he can measure the bill 
received for professional advice. The difficulty with this 
position is that since the tariff itself is not subjected 
50 
51 
to external scrutiny, there is no guarantee that even a 
fee which conforms to the tariff is a fair fee. Moreover, 
as has been pointed out, the tariff· usually prescribes 
only a minimum fee and a charge in excess of it would not 
be (for that reason) improper. 
Next, tariffs are defended on the basis that the 
client is entitled to the benefit of the best professional 
advice available. If he is attracted by an illicit offer 
of a saving in the price of the professional service, 
rather than on the basis of superior quality, there is a 
distortion of his judgment. This defence of tariffs, 
however, is hard to sustain in view of the fact that few 
professions (especially those which cater to a "lay" 
public) have developed ways of identifying their members 
by criteria which would help a client select the "right" 
practitioner. 
Finally, perhaps most persuasively, it is argued that 
tariffs are necessary to avoid a situation in which a 
professional becomes dependent upon thi.n profit margins 
and a high turnover of clients, a . situation which might 
tempt him to shave the quality of the service in order to 
increase the turnover and thus to secure an "adequate" 
living. Yet this defence too poses a host of difficulties. 
What, for example, is an "adequate" living: $12 ,000? 
$18,000? $30,000? $75,000? Moreover, the problem of 
sub-standard service is an independent one; professional 
bodies should (and, to some extent, do) police the quality 
of service rendered by their members in any event. And, 
as common observation indicates, professionals even without 
the pressure of thin profit margins tend to be over-commit-
ted and over-extended - perhaps because many of them are 
work addicts or driven by professional pride and the enjoy-
ment of their work, rather than by greed or need. 
Whatever might be the justifications for price fixing, 
the practice is effectively struck down by section 16 of the 
new Bill. In the market for professional services, as in 
all other markets, the rule contemplated by the statute is 
the rule of competition. 
However, the Bill does provide protection for profes-
sional fee tariffs established and implemented in accor-
dance with section 92 of the Bill. 
In order to qualify for such protection, tariffs or 
other forms of conduct which would violate the price 
fixing prohibitions must meet three conditions. First, 
the profession asserting the claim to immunity must have 
been "designated" by either the provincial legislature or 
by parliament. Second, no protection is to be afforded to 
persons who are engaged in the supply of goods or in the 
construction industry, limitations which would seem to deny 
protection respectively to pharmacists and civil engineers 
and architects. Third, the conduct called into question 
must be authorized by a federal or provincial statute, or 
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scrutiny of a body charged with the duty of protecting the 
public interest . This last point is rather obscure . Almost 
all professional associations are established by legislation, 
and exercise delegated legislative powers over their members. 
It has been thought that, even without explicit mention of 
the phrase "public interest", this is the sole purpose of 
conferring delegated powers upon a professional body. Thus, 
even at the present time , the governing bodies of profes-
sions are required to adhere to the public interest, although 
some occasionally fall short of that important standard. 
Does the new section 93(2) (e) require the incantation of 
the magic words "public in terE!st " iri the statute? If so, 
most statutes governing the professions would have to be 
amended, for what would appear to be purely formal reasons. 
On the other hand , if the new section means that a tribunal 
or court would look behind the statutory declaration that 
the Benchers of the Law Society or the Governing Council 
of the College of Physicians and Surgeons are acting in the 
public interest , to see if they are actually doing so, it 
does not say so with any degree of specificity. 
This new approach to professional fee tariffs is 
probably of benefit to both the public and the profession, 
but likely of only marginal importance. So far as many lay 
people are concerned , they cannot afford any fee at all , no · 
matter how it is fixed , no matter how reasonable it might 
be on any objective criterion . The cost of drugs, medical 
and legal care is beyond the reach of much of our population. 
Surely the way to deal with this problem is not to drive 
fee levels down through the competitive processes , but 
rather to make the services available through medicare or 
legal aid schemes . 
Who would benefit from prohibitions against profession-
al price fixing? In some areas , for example law and archi-
tecture , the client who needs and can afford service is 
usually not worried about cost; he will pass it on to the 
ul timat.e consumer. For example , lawyers , architects, 
engineer~ and realtors all charge fees which become part of 
the ultimate cost of building an apartment building and are 
reflected in the rent. No doubt a more modest "tariff" 
might somewhat reduce building costs. But it i s problem-
atical that any such reduction would lead to a reduction in 
rent ; it is much more probable that it would increase the 
developer ' s profit margin. On the other hand, of course, 
there will be some savings for ultimate consumers. The 
redu~tion of realtors ' fees for ordinary purchase and sale 
transactions, or of lawyers' fees for routine conveyancing, 
will no doubt be of some marginal utility for a sizeable 
segment. of our population . But, as I will try to demonstrate, 
the real gains i~ bringing professional services within 
reach at a reasonable cost lie potentially in quite a 
different direction. 
I next wish to discuss a group of miscel l aneous 
restrictive practices such as prohibitions against adver-
tising, refusals to deal and the like. 
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Traditionally, professions have frowned on advertising. 
In part this attitude reflects a sense of social distance 
from those who are merely engaged in business; in part, it 
represents an attempt to ensure that gullible clients are 
not attracted to the noisiest, rather than the best , 
members of the profession; and in part it represents a 
desire to preserve its established practices and patterns 
of relationships . Section 16(1) , however, permits restric-
tions on advertising so long as they are unrelated to price. 
Accordingly, the traditional professional attitudes will 
remain undisturbed by the Bill. 
Price discrimination, another practice which is prima 
facie outlawed by the new legislation , is not really a 
problem in many of the professions. However,it may some-
times happen that individual clients receive discriminatory 
advantages, either because they are poor or because they 
are the source of a good deal of work. But, although 
section 38(1) outlaws price discrimination as a general 
matter, certain exceptions are provided by section 38(2), 
including immunities for price discrimination if it is 
not granted " to any significant customer .. . in any market". 
It is difficult to see that in many professional situations 
a particular client would fall within the definition of 
"a significant customer". 
Sections 39 and 40 dealing with professional allowances 
and other kinds of restrictive practices likewise would 
seem to have little or no significance for the professions . 
However, to the extent that such restrictive practices do . 
fal l within the proscription of these provisions, section 
92 - which I have discussed in connection with price 
fixing - also provides irrununities against these miscellane-
ous restrictive practices . Of course, the protection of 
section 92 is only available , again, to designated profes-
sions which are regulated by a public body charged with 
protecting the .public interest. 
I have deliberately omitted , so far, any mention of 
the area in which the impact of the statute is potentially 
the greatest : its prohibitions against monopolization. 
The professions typically enjoy monopoly power in relation 
to services within their respective jurisdictions. This 
monopoly is secured by legislation which forbids laymen to 
render the services provided by members of the profession. 
Its justification is certainly sound in theory : 
professional services require a high degree of skill; those 
who already. possess such skill are uniquely qualified to 
assess new aspirants;· by certifying their competence , and 
admitting them to the ranks of the professional organi-
zation, they are identified to the public as qualified 
practitioners. 
In practice, however, this r ationale for professional 
monopoly is not always observed. By this I do not mean to 
say that all of the professions , or indeed any of the 
professions all · of the time , abuse thei r monopoly. But , 
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there is some evidence to suggest that some professions 
may be thought to artificially limit their numbers so as to 
maximize the income of their members by creating a scarcity 
situation. Again, there is some evidence that some profes-
sions may ·refuse to admit members or may discipline and 
expel members, for reasons which do not relate to the 
protection of the public against dishonesty or incompetence; 
and further, some professions, from time to time may be lax 
in policing the competence and honesty of their members. 
Should we, then, seek to dismantle all professional monopo-
lies or should we rather seek the development of safeguards 
which will ensure the protection of · the public against the 
abuse of monopoly? As a general matter, the new Bill 
prohibits monopolization. Read literally, section 17(a) (ii) 
might be construed to apply to attempts to "prevent the 
entry of a person into a market" for professional services, 
even though the motive for such action is his lack of 
professional qualifications. Again, on a purely literal 
reading, members of a profession would violate section 
17(b) if they "engage in behaviour" that is intended to 
place them "together with other persons" in a monopoly 
position. This prohibition precisely describes the role 
and function of the officers of a professional body. And 
note: section 92 provides no immunity for monopolistic 
conduct by the professions. 
But the professions need not despair. It is virtually 
certain that the Bill is not intended to dismantle the 
whole structure of professional government. Read in context, 
section 17 does not appear to be directed towards bodies 
exercising delegated governmental authority, as do the 
professional bodies. The very fact that section 92 makes 
no attempt to immunize professional monopolies suggests 
that the draftsmen of the Bill thought that they were not 
covered in any event. Surely it would not have been neces-
sary to protect professionals against the innocuous risks 
of prosecution for granting promotional allowances, if the 
whole structure of the professions was to be overturned. 
Even more importantly, it is almost certain that the 
Federal Government has no constitutional power to destroy 
the system of professional governments created by Provincial 
legislation. 
Nonetheless, even if we assume that professional mono-
poly needs to be left intact by . the new Bill, we must still 
confront the question of how it is to be channelled into 
directions which involve the protection of the public 
interest. There are four broad approaches, which are not 
n'ecessarily mutually exclusive. The first possibility 
would be to introduce elements of public control into the 
processes of professional government . This has been done 
in Ontario in many professions, following the recommenda-
tions of the McRuer Report. It is about to be done on a 
much more comprehensive basis in Quebec, following the 
recommendations of the Castonguay Report. While the 
public presence may in fact ultimately turn out to be 
symbolic, it could lead to more careful scrutiny by the 
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profession of its public responsibilities. This certainly 
is the desired objective of those advocating public repres-
entation on the governing boards of .professional bodies. 
Second , even if it be conceded that the profession 
must maintain a monopoly over work requiring a high level 
of skill and knowledge, are there not some tasks which can 
be delegated to, or performed entirely by, para-professionals 
and technicians? These persons may work either under 
the direction of a professional (as do dental hygenists 
or law clerks) or be constituted as a separate occupational 
group which operates autonomously (as do denturists or lay 
advocates) wi th direct relations between "clients" and 
themselves . 
In either case there wil l be some benefit to the 
client in terms of cost savings, although probably the 
greatest benefits would be derived from access to autono-
mous para-professionals. 
Before this solution can be implemented, however, 
careful analysis is required of the basis of the professions ' 
asserted claims to the exclusive right to render service. 
There must be assurance that the para-professional or 
technician is in fact adequate to the task at hand . 
Moreover, in making such an assessment , there is the 
additional difficulty that the "de-professionalization " of 
tasks strikes at the honestly he l d convictions of profes-
sionals who tend to favour increased sophistication and 
complexity as evidence of increased competence - and as a 
value in itself. 
Third, there is a possibility of creating counter-
vailing forces and alternative and more efficient institu-
tions for the delivery of professional services. 
For example, in legal aid and medicare plans, the 
government , either directly or indirectly , bargains with 
the profession over the price of services . Not only does 
this bargaining process lead to some restraint in charges 
imposed upon the ultimate "client" but,as well,cost pres-
sures are generated which may ultimately lead to substan-
tive reforms. For example , undefended divorces consume a 
very large fraction of the total cost of the Ontario Legal 
Aid Plan. By moving these from the Supreme to the County 
Court, considerable cost savings are effected , which 
benefit not only the Plan , but persons who are paying the 
cost of their own domestic litigation. Or , to take another 
example , t h e high cost of prescriptions led to l egislation 
in Ontari o promoting the use of generic rather than brand 
name .drugs . 
Quite apart from governmental pressures, new experi-
ments with both medical and legal clinics may lead to the 
development of systems for delivering professional services 
more cheaply and in a more congenial setting for persons 
who could not afford any fee , no matter how low. 
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Fourth, certain kinds of substantive reforms which are 
generated by professional knowledge and skill may contrib-
ute significantly to the reduction of the cost of profes-
sional services. Examples which come readily to mind are 
reforms in the system of land registry, the use of modular 
components in housing construction, and the fluoridation 
of the water supply. In each case, structural solutions 
were developed by members of the profession to ultimately 
enable consumers to receive the benefit of a professional 
service more cheaply or to avoid it altogether. 
The point I want to make conce.rning all of these 
changes is that they relate basically to substantive, 
structural or institutional reforms. It is from such 
reforms, rather than the prospect of enhanced competition, 
that in my view the greatest potential benefit to the public 
is to be derived. 
Whether we look at the professions from the point of 
view of economic benefits such as price, innovation, and 
efficiency, or from the point of view of social effects, 
such as the distribution of social and political power, 
the real gains are beyond the reach of any statute such 
as the Competition Act. Such acts operate basically to 
sanction offenders rather than to generate affirmative and 
fundamental institutional changes. 
Perhaps it would be well to conclude with a historical 
analogy. In retrospect, it has often been suggested that 
the enactment of our first Combines Act in 1889 was a 
gesture of symbolic reassurance designed to register 
popular discontent with the growth of uncontrolled economic 
and political power within the business community. As a 
force which actually moulded the Canadian economy and its 
important industrial and commercial participants, the 
legislation probably had minimal impact. Perhaps the 
impact of the 'new Competition Act on the professions will 
likewise turn out to be mere symbolic reassurance designed 
to allay widespread public questionlng of traditional 
professional prerogatives. 
